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1 
SCIENCE FOR JUDGES III    
     INTRODUCTION 
Margaret A. Berger* 
The essays that follow are expanded versions of presentations 
made to federal and state court judges at the third Science for 
Judges conference, held at Brooklyn Law School in March 2004. 
These programs, which are funded by the Common Benefit Trust 
established in the Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability 
Litigation, are held under the auspices of Brooklyn Law School’s 
Center for Health, Science and Public Policy in collaboration with 
the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts, 
and the Science, Technology and Law Panel of the National 
Academies of Science. The program’s aim is to examine evolving 
scientific issues in order to assist judges in handling litigation in 
their courtrooms, and that goal is certainly achieved by the papers 
that follow. Although the topics were chosen long before the dates 
on which the conference took place, recent developments have 
intensified the significance of the cutting-edge subjects that were 
discussed. 
The first session, Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific 
Research, dealt with the complexities of relationships within the 
scientific community that shape the scientific culture in which 
research is conducted and reported. The extent to which conflicts 
of interest within the biomedical enterprise skew scientific 
conclusions and impact public health has lately been a topic of 
considerable interest to regulators, academics, the media, and the 
public. Much of this debate was fueled by recent disclosures about 
failures to release research data regarding the effect of 
                                                          
 * Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
Professor Berger is the Director of the Science for Judges Program. 
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2 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
antidepressants on children1 and the incidence of heart attacks and 
strokes following the use of cox-II inhibitors.2 
In light of these newsworthy events, two papers that follow are 
of particular interest. The first3 is by an insider, Dr. David Korn, a 
prestigious participant in the medical community; the second4 is by 
Professor Sheldon Krimsky, whose research agenda has long 
focused on linkages between science and public policy. Despite the 
very different perspectives from which they write, both authors 
agree that far-reaching changes have resulted in the 
commercialization of biomedical research and express serious 
concerns about the implications these changes have for the 
production of credible science. Dr. Korn endorses a variety of 
changes directed at managing financial conflicts of interest, but 
cautions that overzealous efforts may have deleterious 
consequences with regard to the production of biomedical 
research. Professor Krimsky’s paper focuses on studies published 
in medical journals that examine the effect of funding on research 
conclusions. He concludes that the mere disclosure of financial 
conflicts may be inadequate to protect the integrity of scientific 
research and cautions judges about biases that may infect a 
Daubert hearing.5 Read together, the two papers demonstrate the 
enormous impact scientific conflicts of interest may have on 
resolving questions both in and outside the courtroom, and the 
difficult task judges face in evaluating the research on which 
experts rely. 
David Michaels and Celeste Monforton’s paper6 carries 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Barry Meier, Contracts Keep Drug Research Out of Reach, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at A1. 
2 See, e.g., Barry Meier, Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble 
for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at A1. 
3 David Korn, Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research, 13 J.L & 
POL’Y 7 (2005). 
4 Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science and its Implications for 
the Judiciary, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 43 (2005). 
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), requires 
federal judges to screen proffered expert testimony to determine whether it is 
relevant and reliable. See also infra note 11. 
6 David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the 
Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal 
BERGER MACROED FINAL 021805.DOC 3/8/2005 12:27 PM 
 SCIENCE FOR JUDGES III 3 
forward two themes discussed in the first two papers: the medical 
crises that may be precipitated by a lack of crucial information and 
the impact funding may have on the availability of data. Michaels 
and Monforton pose these questions with regard to the regulation 
of workplace hazards by administrative agencies. Starting with the 
case of Eric Peoples, a 32-year-old worker in a microwave popcorn 
factory who developed a rare and devastating lung disease after 
being exposed to a butter flavoring chemical, they examine the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) 
response and failure to take regulatory action. They conclude that 
workers may ultimately have to rely on the courts as the only path 
to compelling more protection in the workplace. According to the 
authors, “there is a growing trend in regulatory agencies that 
demands proof over precaution in the realm of public health and 
the environment.”7 
The remaining essays are devoted to a very different, but 
equally timely, subject: the admissibility of forensic evidence in 
criminal proceedings. Just weeks before the conference was held, 
one of the topics—fingerprinting—took center stage when the FBI 
announced that the fingerprints of Brandon Mayfield, a Portland, 
Oregon attorney, had been found on a bag of detonators discovered 
near the scene of the terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain that killed 
191 people and injured several thousand more. Many 
developments in this case and the final denouement—the Spanish 
authorities’ rejection of the fingerprint match, the identification of 
someone else as the source of the print, and the release of Mr. 
Mayfield from custody—took place after the live program at 
Brooklyn Law School. Fortunately for the reader, Professor Sandy 
Zabell, who made the presentation on fingerprints, has revised and 
updated his remarks to include a full discussion of the Mayfield 
case.8 His article presents a fascinating study of how mistakes in 
matching fingerprints can occur and explains why reliable 
fingerprint identifications hinge not only on the examiner’s ability 
to make matches, but also on having data that validate the 
                                                          
Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 17 (2005). 
7 Id. at 32. 
8 Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143 (2005). 
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frequency with which particular friction ridge details occur. He 
then examines in detail the current research on fingerprints, which 
is deficient in these respects, and compares what is known about 
fingerprints with what is known about DNA. 
The differences in fingerprint and DNA analysis are 
particularly compelling because of the papers that precede 
Professor Zabell’s in this issue of the Journal of Law and Policy. 
Professor Julian Adams examines the methods used to match 
nuclear and mitochondrial DNA samples and then discusses how 
the frequency of DNA profiles is determined.9 He stresses “that the 
evidentiary value of DNA evidence is directly related to the 
frequency of a DNA profile.”10 He explains how the estimated 
frequency of a nuclear DNA profile has decreased following the 
increase in the number of STR loci used by the FBI, and contrasts 
and accounts for the much higher frequencies associated with 
mitochondrial DNA. His discussion reinforces Professor Zabell’s 
conclusions about the lack of validated knowledge regarding the 
frequency of fingerprint patterns. 
Professor Edward Cheng’s article on mitochondrial DNA 
further highlights the differences between nuclear and 
mitochondrial DNA.11 It also contains a succinct and valuable 
discussion of problems posed by mtDNA evidence that courts may 
have to resolve in the future. For instance, although examinations 
of mtDNA clearly seem superior to microscopic hair analysis in 
more accurately attributing hairs found at a crime scene to their 
source, on what grounds, if any, should courts repudiate the 
microscopic technique on which they allowed experts to rely for 
more than a century? Is this a Daubert question, a matter of “best 
evidence,” or a Rule 403 problem? Professor Cheng’s discussion 
provides a useful framework for examining issues that arise as 
other new technologies emerge or old technologies are challenged. 
One such challenge is the subject of Michael O. Finkelstein 
                                                          
9  Julian Adams, Nuclear and Mitochondrial DNA in the Courtroom, 13 
J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2005). 
10 Id. at 88. 
11 Edward K. Cheng, Mitochondrial DNA: Emerging Legal Issues, 13 J.L. 
& POL’Y 99 (2005). 
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and Bruce Levin’s article on bullet-lead analysis.12 The FBI’s 
crime laboratory had, for many years, been analyzing and 
comparing the composition of bullets recovered at a crime scene 
with that of bullets found in the possession of a suspect. If the 
concentrations of the elements in the samples compared closely 
enough, the FBI’s examiner would declare that the bullets matched 
and then would further testify about the probative value of the 
match. In response to growing objections about this testimony by 
FBI experts, particularly with regard to probative value, the FBI 
commissioned a study by the National Research Council. A 
committee (on which Mr. Finkelstein served) was appointed to 
examine the technique of bullet-lead matching. It issued its 
findings in February 2004. 
Part of the Finkelstein and Levin paper discusses the 
committee’s findings and recommendations. The committee 
concluded that FBI experts at times testified in ways that could not 
be justified by the available science and data. The paper explains 
why this is so and gives examples of acceptable and unacceptable 
formulations by experts that should prove extremely helpful to 
judges and lawyers working on cases in which testimony about 
bullet-lead analysis is offered. Furthermore, the paper explains that 
the limitations suggested by the committee would apply to other 
kinds of expert identification testimony and, if adopted, “would 
change the way opinions in expert testimony are expressed in our 
courts.”13 
Although analyses of the first decade of experience with the 
Supreme Court’s new test14 for the admissibility of expert 
testimony demonstrate that courts rarely applied Daubert criteria to 
                                                          
12 Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Compositional Analysis of Bullet 
as Forensic Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 119 (2005). 
13 Id. at 129. 
14 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For a 
discussion of Daubert and subsequent Supreme Court cases regulating the 
admissibility of expert proof, see Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s 
Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/sciman00.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2005). 
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prosecution experts,15 that mindset may slowly be starting to 
change. Indeed, the FBI’s request for a report on the validity of 
bullet-lead testing may be an indication that a sea change is in the 
offing. The second half of the Finkelstein and Levin paper is, 
therefore, extremely important because it examines in detail the 
scientific underpinnings for bullet lead analyses, relates them to 
Daubert factors, and suggests additional scientific studies for the 
FBI to undertake. This approach might serve as a template for 
scrutinizing other forensic identification techniques and may assist 
judges in handling the Daubert challenges to prosecution experts 
they may increasingly face in the future. 
These very brief descriptions of the essays that follow certainly 
do not do justice to the authors’ sophisticated explorations of their 
topics. It is hoped, however, that these remarks convey a glimpse 
of the variety, complexity, and currency of the scientific questions 
that judges may encounter in their courtrooms, and that the essays 
themselves will prove helpful in understanding and resolving the 
demanding science intertwined with policy issues that arise in 
twenty-first century America. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Joelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry Becomes an 
(Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (stating “the 
Daubert revolution, aimed at upgrading the quality of expert evidence, has had 
surprisingly little impact in the criminal courts.”). See also Symposium, Expert 
Admissibility Symposium, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2003). 
